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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARIELLE LeBOUTHILLIER, and D E -
NISE, GISELE, VICTOR, and SUSANNE 
LeBOt:THILLIER, minors by their Guardian 
ad !item, ELAINE K. WOOD, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
GLORIA OLIVER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
SHURTLEFF & ANDREWS, INC., a cor-
poration, 
Defendant and Third Party 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
PETER KIEWIT CONSTRUCTION CO., 
MORRISON KNUDSON, INC., and MID-
VALLEY, INC., doing business as ARCH 
DAM CONSTRUCTORS, 
Third Party Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
10363 
BRIEF OF THIRD PARTY DEFENDANTS AND 
RESPONDENTS ARCH DAM CONSTRUCTORS 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
These are two separate actions for wrongful death 
of employees of third party defendants, who were killed 
in a crane accident in the course of their employment. 
The cases \Vere consolidated for trial. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LO\VER COURT 
The case was submitted to the jury on special inter-
rogatories and the jury found that although defendant 
2 
0\\-1wr-lPssor of tlw crmw wa::-; guilt~- of m'gligem·(_' in 
failing to insp(_'et tlw crmw, suC'h nc'glig(_'ne<~ was not 
a proxirnak can;-:p of the aceicl(_'nt. Accordingly judg-
ment was enkn'cl in favor of th<:' dd'c'ndant and against 
the plaintiffs in Paeh ease, no cause of action. 
RELIEF sorGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek an affinnance of the judgment 
b(_'low. 
STATEl\IE~T OF FACTS 
In this brief we shall refer to the decedents by their 
surnames; to the defendant Shurtleff & Andrews, Inc., 
as defendant, and to the third party defendants collec-
tively as Arch Dam. 
There is some duplication m the numbering of the 
pages of the record. The papers, pleadings, and other 
documents in the Oliver file are numbered from 1 to 252. 
The papers in the LeBouthillier file are numbered con-
secutively from 1 to l/G. The pages of the transcript 
are numbered from 177 to 5GG. References to the papers 
and pleadings in the Oliver case will hP prefaced by the 
letter ''0" e.g. ( 0.R. :Z7). Similarly references to the 
LeBouthillier pa1wrs will he prefaced by the letter '•L'' 
and to the transcript by the letter "T." 
\Ye he lieve that some restatement of the facts of 
the case and enlargement thereof, will help to bring the 
issues of the case into better focus. The basic facts of 
the case are without dispute. The decedents were em-
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ploye>t>s of Arch Dam. On ::\larch 29, 19G3, they were 
\\'orkinµ: as }Jart of a new around a erane owned by 
1lf'f1•ndant, and temporarily lt•ased to Arch Dam. Oliver 
1\as tlt1· oil<•r on tlw cra1w, (T.R. 238) and LeBouthillier 
1rns an iron worker. The jib of the crane for some 
n·ason tilted ovPr hackward, broke loose from the end 
of tlte boom, and foll to the ground striking and killing 
tlw t\Y() decedents. 
Ther1.• was a sharp dispute at trial between plaintiffs 
and <lefrndant as to the cause of the jib tipping over. 
lt \nls plaintiffs' theory that a portion of the connection 
between the boom and the jib was so worn, rusty, cracked 
and othern·ise defective, that it was unable to withstand 
the stresses of the winds which occurred in the vicinity, 
and that winds blowing against the side of the jib had 
sufficient force to cause and did cause the joint or 
rnmwction to fail, and permitted the jib to fall to the 
ground. This contention was set forth in the pretrial 
order as follows: 
"Plaintiff's counsel specified that the con-
nection between the jib and the boom was faulty 
and defective in that it 'vas broken, worn, cracked, 
distorted, in a rusty condition, and very elongated 
... " (0.R. 50, L.R. 82). 
Defendant contended, inter alia, that the sole cause 
of the accident was negligence on the part of Arch Dam's 
operator in pulling the headache ball on the end of the 
whip-line up to the sheaves on the point of the jib, thus 
causing it to tilt backward. (0.R. 52, L.R. 8±). ·while 
both parties asserted other contentions during the trial, 
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the> ahove conflict was tlw n•al ''nub" of the eont<>f't 
between them. 
Plaintiffs' tlwory was who11>· lmsup1lorted h>· any 
e>·e-witness testirnon>· at trial. 'l'ht>y relit>d ehit>flv on 
the testimon>· of Dan Schwartz, a mechanical design 
engi1wer ( 'J'. R. --l-1:l), to t•stablish tlwir theory. Ht> testi-
fied as follmrn: 
He had rnadr> a ddailPd study of a crane similar 
to thP one involved in the accident. As a rPsult of his 
studit>s, he had coneluded that a jib with an enlongated 
hole sueh as that -.,d1ich existt>d prior to thP accident 
here involv<•d, would fracture under a pressure of 171,000 
pounds lJer square inch. This would be the Pquivalent 
of a wind force of 25 milt>s per hour. (T.R. 422--±23). He 
of course had no knowlt>dge as to the wind force whieh 
existed on the day of the accident. He had no opinion 
as to the time that would he required to produce the 
elongation in the connecting holes which existed at the 
time the accidPn t oecUlTPd, ( T .R. 424), although he was 
of the opinion that elongation did not occur immediately 
or instantaneously. (T.R. 451). 
"\Villiam Giroux, an engineer employed by Arch Dam, 
(T.R. 352), also testified that in his opinion the accident 
was caused by a side wind blowing on the jib (T.R. 3G6--
3G9). Although he was on the job site at the time the 
accident occurred, he did not witness the accident. (T.R. 
358). Like Schwartz, he was of the opinion that the 
crack in the male ear occurred sometime prior to the 
accident, but did not know when it occurred or how 
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lllUCh time would he n~quired to produce it. He opined 
that it might have heen there as early as January 6th. 
(T.R. 3H). It was his opinion that "roting" of the 
erane (traveling with the hoom and jib attached), prob-
ably produced the elongation of the connecting holes. 
\ T.R. 377). 
This was the entire extent of the evidence which 
plaintiffs ,,·ere able to produce to support their theory. 
Th<:>re was no evidence whatsoever as to the velocity of 
the wind at the time of, and immediately preceding, the 
accident, or as to its direction. 
Several witnesses testified that it was windy and 
gusty. ( T.R. 197, 212, 28-1-, 367, 369). However, neither 
the crane operator Twitchell, ( T. R. 23-1- et seq.), Conrad 
Carlberg, nor Theron Holmes, all of whom were present 
when the accident occurred, and were called as witnesses 
for the plaintiffs, expressed any opinion whatsoever as 
to the cause of the accident. Holmes testified specifically 
that he had no opinion as to the cause of the accident. 
(T.R. 305-6). The others were not asked. 
Nor can it be overlooked that Twitchell had never 
before operated this particular crane, and that it had 
features which were different from other cranes he had 
operated, and which could easily result in a raising of 
the whip-line by mistake. (T.R. 237, 2-19, 25-1, 255). 
On the other hand, "'William Barnes, an eye witness 
to the accident, testified clearly and unequivocally that 
Twitchell "two-blocked" the jib, that is, he caused the 
headache ball on the whip-line to be drawn into the 
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sheaves at the point of tlw jib, pulling it ovPr backward. 
( T .R. -mo, 510-511). The testimony of Carlberg, was 
somewhat corroborative of this view. He testified that 
the jib cam0 straiµ;ht haek to a cPrtain point, rather than 
bending off to thP right as theorized by plaintiff's ex-
perts. ( T .R 210). 
Holmes also kstified that during the period of ap-
proximatPl~- a month before the aceident, the crane and 
the jib ·were subjected to heavy use by Arch Dam that 
taxed its capacity, and eould have produced the elonga-
tion in the connecting holes. ( T .R. 289, 290). 
This factual issue was squarely presented to the 
jury under the court's instructions. 
In instruction No. 1 the court advised the jury "to 
first consider plaintiffs' claim against the defendant 
Shurtleff & Andrews, Inc., and if you find the issues 
in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant 
Shurtleff & Andrews, Inc., thereafter consider the claim 
of defendant Shurtleff & Andrews, Inc., against the third 
party defendant Arch Darn Constructors." (Emphasis 
ours.) (0.R. 93). Assumedly the jury complied with this 
direction. 
Bv the court's instruction No. 8, it advised the jury 
that the plaintiffs had the burden of proving their sep-
arate causes of action against the defendant, and that 
if they were not persuaded by the greater weight of 
the evidence, or if they found the evidence equally bal-
anced on either the issues of negligence or proximate 
cause, that their verdict should be in favor of the de-
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frndant and against the plaintiffs, no cause of action. 
(0.R 101). 
Ddendant's theory that negligence of the operator 
\ms tlil' sole proximate cause of the accident was im-
plicit in the court's instruction No. 15 on efficient inter-
vc>ning cause. ( 0.R. 108). By the court's instruction 
~o. lS, the jury was advised that it could not indulge 
in conjecture or speculation. (0.R. 111). Defendant's 
theory of negligence of the crane operator was specif-
ically set forth in instruction No. 20 ( O.R. 113). Plain-
tiffs' attorney clearly recognized this as an issue in the 
case in his request for special interrogatories, No. 7 ( d), 
( O.R. 177). Defendant's reliance upon the theory was 
also set forth in its requests No. 9, (0.R. 214), No. 23, 
( O.R. 2:28) and request for special interrogatories No. 
3(d), (0.R. 238). 
In spite of the fact that this factual issue was one 
of the principal factual issues dividing the parties, and 
in spite of the fact that the court recognized this and 
instructed the jury on these issues in some detail, for 
some strange reason it provided no place in its special 
verdict for a finding on this material issue. The only 
issue of defendant's negligence submitted to the jury 
was ·whether it was negligent in failing to inspect the 
crane from time to time after it went on the job. (0.R. 88). 
In view of the admissions of defendant's president, 
Max Andrews, that the crane was never inspected from 
the time it went on the job-site in July, 1962 to the date 
of the accident (T.R. 322, 348, 529), the jury was well 
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justifo•d in finding that defendant was negligent in thi,; 
regard. H(nn'ver, that ,,·ould not compd a finding that 
such negligence was a proximate cause of the accident. 
The jury may wdl have believed that the accident wa:" 
solely and lH'Oximakly caused by the negligence of Arch 
Dam's operator Twitchell, as contended hy defonclant. 
The only \my in which it could express this finding in 
the verdict fonn submitkcl to it, \\·as by finding as it 
did, that the negligence of defendant was not a proximat12 
cause of the accident. (0.R. 88). 
It must be recognized that interrogatory No. 4 of 
the special verdict was not intended to determine the 
issues behnen plaintiffs and defendant, hut rather to 
determine the liability of Arch Dam to defendant in the 
event that defendant was found liable to the plaintiffs. 
In view of the jury's findings on special interrogatories 
No. 2 and Ko. 3, the other findings became moot. :More-
over, interrogatory No. 4 was not couched in terms of 
determining negligence on the part of Arch Dam, but 
rather in terms of determining whether Arch Dam vio-
lated a contractual agreement with defendant. It was, 
and is, tlw view of Arch Dam that the construction of 
this contract was a question of law to be determined by 
the court and should never have been submitted to the 
jury at all. ( T.R. :335, 560-562). However, the fact that the 
jury may have found that Arch Dam had a duty under 
its contract to dismantle the crane and inspect it, and 
that failure to do so was a proximate cause of the acci-
dent does not also establish that common law negligence 
' 
on the part of defendant in failure to make inspections, 
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\nls n<>cessarily a proximat(• cause of the accident. The 
eYidt'n('e would support a finding that the defect in the 
cram~ ocuured, or became subject to discovery by inspec-
tion, after the last time that defendant had an opportunity 
to inspect; or that Arch Dam's failure to discover the 
defrct \\·as an independent intervening act; or that negli-
g-enc·e upon the part of the crane operator was an inde-
pendent intervening act. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE .JVRY'S SPECIAL FINDINGS DO NOT 
EXTITLE PLAINTIFFS TO JUDGMENT IN 
THEIR FAVOR. 
The jury specifically found that negligence upon the 
part of defendant was not a cause of the accident. As 
is amply demonstrated from the foregoing Statement of 
Facts, this finding was adequately supported by the 
evidence. The finding is tantamount to finding that 
plaintiffs failed to prove, by a perponderance of the evi-
dence, that negligence on the part of defendant was a 
proximate cause of the accident. In view of the weakness 
in plaintiffs' proof the jury could hardly have found 
otherwise. However, plaintiffs seek to pick themselves 
up hy tlwir own bootstraps by pointing to subsequent 
findings made by the jury with regard to the issues 
between defendant and third party defendant, claiming 
that such findings are inconsistent with the findings 
on defendant's negligence and causation, and reasoning 
from this premise that the jury's answer to interrogatory 
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No. 3 should bt> (•hanged so as to reqmre a jucl1:,1111ent 
m their favor. 
The fallacy of this contention is patent to casual 
t•xamination. In order for the plaintiffs to he Pntitled 
to recover against dt>fonclant, they had the burden of 
proving by a prt•ponclerance of the l'Vidence the followino-
ti 
facts: 
1. There was a defect in clt>fendant's crane at the 
time the crane was leased to Arch Dam. 
2. A reasonable inspection should have discovered 
the defect. 
3. The defect was the cause of the accident. 
·with respect to item No. 1, the testimony of plain-
tiffs' own experts was to the effect that it could not be 
determined when the defect arose, or how long it had 
existed. All that they could state with certainty was that 
it had occurred and existed some time prior to the acci-
dent. This could have been a matter of days, weeks, or 
months. It could have occurred during the time that it 
was in the possession of Arch Dam. In fact, evidence 
produced by plaintjffs indicated that the crane was sub-
jected to heavy use by Arch Dam, capable of producing 
excessive strain on the jib connection, in the month 
preceding the accident. 
·with respect to item Ko. 2, the evidence established 
that it was good practice to make a daily examination 
of the various lines and cables which would be supporting 
the weight of the loads, and that this was done by Arch 
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Dam's employePs wlwm•wr they used the crane. (T.R. 
:299). However, the evidence showed without dispute 
that thP defects in the male ear on the jib connection 
would not be visible to any kind of an inspection short 
of di:'rnantling the jib from the boom. According to the 
testimony of Carlberg, this would require six to seven 
man-homs, including the job of re-assembling. There 
\\·as no evidence whah;oever that it was good crane prac-
tic·.- to make such an inspection, or if so, how frequently 
~ueh an in::;pection should be made. The witness White 
t\·:c:ti fied that it would not be normal to make such an 
inspection. ( T .R. 521). The evidence does show that in 
.January or February, 1963, less than three months before 
the accident occurred, and possibly as little as two months 
lwfore the accident occurred, the boom and jib had been 
sr>parated and had been re-assembled. It was the testi-
mony of both Holmes and Pilling that had there been 
any defect, it would have been noted by the iron workers 
at that time. There was no evidence from which a jury 
could find that there was any duty to dissassemble the 
crane and re-inspect it again prior to the time the acci-
dent occurred. 
"\Vi th respect to item No. 3, plaintiffs' proof was 
limited to the testimony of a couple of experts whose 
opinions "\Vere based upon assumptions of fact of which 
there was no evidence. There was no evidence whatso-
ever in the reocrd that at the time of the accident there 
was 'l\.ind of such force as to produce a fracture of the 
jib connection as theorized by Schwartz. In short, there 
was a complete failure of proof on the part of plaintiffs. 
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The Strandholm case, cited by plaintiffs at pagP 13 
of their brief, supports the position of re8pondents in 
this regard. The Oregon court said: 
"It was for the jury to decide if defendant 
negligently performed this duty and if so did 
any of the alleged later failures if any, of Dreyfus 
Company eliminate all liability for that negli-
gence." (Emphasis added). Strandholm v. Gen. 
Cons tr. Co., et al., (Ore.), 382 P. 2d 843. 
The case of Foley v. Pittsburgh-DesMoines Co., 
(Pa.), 68 A. 2d 517, cited and heavily relied upon by 
plaintiffs, does not support their contention that they 
are entitled to a judgment, but on the contrary, supports 
the views of respondents, that unless the jury accepts 
the theories of their (plaintiff's) experts, including the 
facts on which they are based, (which it did not), plain-
tiffs are not entitled to prevail. said the Court: 
"The question thus became one for the jury 
as to whether defendants did use a suitable steel, 
and, if not, whether their failure to do so was 
the result, not of a mere error of judgment on 
their part, but of negligence in failing to realize 
the seriousness of the problem and properly to 
cope with it. 
• • • 
"Thus, while defendants attempted to suggest 
many possible causes to which the accident could 
be attributed, it is clear that if the jury rejected 
their version of the facts, as, of course, it had a 
right to do, their theories as to the cause of the 
accident would automatically fall, while if the 
jury believed the testimony of plaintiffs' wit-
nesses, as presumably it did, it could well con-
13 
eludP that the testimony ::,;upported the version 
of the accident advanced by l\lr. Sarnans, namely, 
that it was due solely to the improper design and 
con::,;truction of the tank and the negligent use by 
defendants of ::,;teel which was inadequate for the 
function it wa::,; called u1JOn to perform. It is true 
that \Yhere, of sevc~ral theories advanced for the 
cause of an accident, one is as plausible as the 
other and equally consistent with the factual testi-
mony, so that the verdict would necessarily be a 
mere guess as to the real cause, no recovery can 
be allowed. . . . Likewise it is true that where 
an injury may be the result of one of several 
causes for only one of which defendant is liable, 
the burden is on the plaintiff to individuate that 
one as the proximate cause of his injury and to 
exclude other causes fairly suggested by the evi-
dence to which it would be equally reasonable to 
attribute the injury." 
Certainly under the evidence, the jury was well 
justified in finding, as it did, that it was not persuaded 
by a preponderance of the evidence that negligence of 
the defendant was a proximate cause of the accident. 
vVhen the jury so found, the case was effectually 
terminated, and the jury's findings on the other inter-
rogatories of the special verdict were wholly moot. Had 
the jury followed literally the language of the court's 
instruction No. 1, they would not even have considered 
interrogatories Nos. 4, 5 and 6 of the special verdict. 
However, from the language of the verdict form, they 
apparently felt required to answer all the questions, and 
undertook to do so. By their answer to interrogatory 
No. 4, they interpreted the contract between defendant 
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and Arch Dam as imposing a duty upon Arch Darn to 
dismantle the crane for the purpose of inspecting the 
connecting parts. As previously noted, this issue should 
never have been submitted to the jury at all. The con-
struction of the contract was a matter of law for the 
court. Ho"·ever, even if this can be said to be a factual 
issue, there is no evidence in the record to support the 
jury's finding on it. The lease agreement says nothing 
whatsoever about making inspections of the type sug-
gested in the court's special verdict. Moreover, even 
conceding that Arch Dam had such a duty and failed to 
perform it, such does not aid the plaintiff. This is a 
finding by the jury concerning Arch Dam's contractual 
obligations to defendant. It has nothing to do with any 
common law obligation of Arch Dam either to defendant 
or to plaintiffs. It follows therefore, that there is no 
inconsistency in the findings. 
It was the duty of the trial court, and it is the duty 
of this court, to harmonize the findings if at all possible 
to do so. In the case of U.A.L., Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F. 2d 
379, the court quoted with approval from the Supreme 
Court of the United States as follows: 
" '[I] t is the duty of the courts to attempt to 
harmonize the answers, if it is possible under a 
fair reading of them: "Where there is a view 
of the case that makes the jury's answers to 
special interrogatories consistent, they must be 
resolved that wav." Atl. & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. 
v. Ellerman Line~, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355, ... ' Gallich 
v. B. & 0. R.R. Co., 372 U.S. 108 at 119, 83 
S.Ct. 659, at 666, 9 L.Ed 2d 618 (1963)." 
This is Pntirely harmonious with the expression of 
this comt in Pace V. Parrish, 122 et. 1±1, 248 P.2d 273 
quoted in defendant's brief at page 16. 
Even if it eould be said that findings 3 and -! are 
incnnsistPnt, such ·would not entitle the plaintiffs to a 
judgment, but at most, only to a new trial. Plaintiffs 
are not c·ntitled to a presumption that those findings 
,d1id1 are in their favor are the correct findings, and 
that inconsistent findings are incorrect and should be 
disregarded. If the findings are inconsistent this court 
may not indulge in any presumptions or assumptions as 
to which findings are correct, but the case should be 
returned to the trial court for a new trial on all issues. 
See Ki11g v. Vet's Cab, (Kan.), 295 P. 2d 605 where the 
court said: 
"Consistent special findings control the gen-
eral verdict when contrary thereto, but when they 
are inconsistent with one another, some showing 
a right to a verdict, and others sho-wing the con-
trary, the case is left to the condition of really 
being undecided, and a new trial should be grant-
ed. * * * 
"* * * Assuming that the answer to question 
No. 1 was a finding of negligence on the part of 
the plaintiff, the trial court could not ignore spe-
cific separate findings which would bar recovery, 
and consider only the finding of negligence on the 
part of defendant and render judgment on the 
latter. To do so, the trial court would be substi-
tuting its judgment for that of the jury, thereby 
denying the defendant the right to a trial by jury 
on the issue of contributory negligence." 
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This is the same result reached hy this eourt 
in Schweitzer v. Stone, 13 Ut. 2d 199, 371 P. 2d 201. 
POINT IL 
THERE \VAS NO REVERSIBLE ERROR IN 
REFUSING 1'0 SUBMIT 1'0 THE .JTRY AP-
PELLANT'S CLAIMS BASED UPON \VAR-
RANTY. 
vVe join in the argument made by defendant and 
respondent under Point II of its brief. \Ve do not see 
that any useful purpose would be served by a detailed 
analysis of the cases cited by plaintiffs. In many of 
them the statements of law are dicta. In others privity 
was not discussed, or was assumed, or apparently existed, 
or was construed to exist. Other cases were based on 
factors not present here, e.g. mass advertising. \Ve do, 
however, invite the court's attention to the well con-
sidered opinion of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island 
in the recent case of Henry v. John W. EshelmCfJn & 
Sons, (1965), 209 A. 2d 46, where the court said: 
"On the facts alleged in each count there is 
clearly no privity between plaintiff and defendant. 
"In sustaining the demurrer the trial justice 
held that under the law in this state ... a con-
sumer could not sue the manufacturer directly in 
assumpsit on such an implied warranty without 
alleging privity. The plaintiffs admit that such 
is the decisional law. . . . 
"However, because it is decisional law and 
not of legislative creation they argue that such 
decisions may and should be overruled since they 
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are based upon an erroneous idea that the implied 
warranty relied upon here is a contractual concept 
whereas it is actually tortious in nature. Hence 
they urge us to ... join the current of modern 
authorities which hold to the contrary ... [Cita-
tions]. 
"A like contention was made by the plaintiffs 
in Lombardi . . . In the course of our opinion in 
that case we discussed these cases and concluded 
not to follow them for any of the variant reasons 
which led them to hold as they did. ·we said ... : 
" 'In our judgment these cases use different 
approaches, but in general strain for a beneficial 
result by declaring the existence of some form of 
a continuing warranty that inures to any con-
sumer as a matter of public policy. But it seems 
to us that ordinarily the declaration of such a 
public policy is a function of the legislature and 
not of the court. It may well be that the statute 
here should be amended to conform more effect-
ually to the advance or change in methods of pur-
veying food in original sealed containers. But 
where, as here, the existing statute does not modi-
fy the common law so as to permit an action in 
assumpsit without privity ... we ought not to 
resort to judicial legislation, at least where no 
emergency or extreme conditions exist.' 
"Three years later, we were urged ... to 
discard the privity of contract theory and over-
rule Lombardi. 1,V e declined to do so and again 
expressed the opinion that if such a change was 
to be made in the law the legislature should make 
it and not the court .... 
". . . A decade has passed since we declared 
in Lombardi that if any change in the law was to 
be made from considerations of public policy the 
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legislature should make it. During that period 
the legislature has nwt in annual sessions and ha~ 
not seen fit to alter in any way the policy of the 
law underlying that decision nothwithstanding it~ 
attention was again called to the continuing criti-
cism of such policy ... 
"Such long acquiescence in decisional law hY 
the legislature, especially after its attention ha·s 
been called to repeated litigious criticism of its 
underlying policy, is persuasive proof of at least 
implied legislative approval of the decisions .... 
In this connection it is interesting to note that 
in some of the recent cases where the courts have 
overruled prior precedents and discarded entirelv 
the privity of contract doctrine they have done s~ 
only after strong dissents or limiting concurring 
opinions.'' 
However, all of this is more or less beside the point. 
Plaintiffs, in their brief, have effectually conceded the 
lack of merit to their contentions. They admit, on page 
23, that even if the issue of warranty had been submitted 
to the jury, the jury's findings on causation would have 
prevented them from a recovery on the warranty theory. 
Even in those jurisdictions where the courts have 
held that the doctrine of privity is no longer a prerequi-
site to an action on an implied warranty, and even in 
those jurisdictions where the courts have imposed a 
doctrine of absolute liability against a manufacturer or 
supplier of chattels, the plaintiffs still have the burden 
of proving that the defect existed at the time the chattel 
left the hands of the manufacturer or supplier. Such a 
showing the plaintiffs failed to make in this case, and 
therefore they would not in any event be entitled to have 
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tlw \rnrranty theory submitted to the jury. This is well 
illu::;tratf'U IJ)' cases cited by plaintiffs in their own brief. 
lll !Jrozrn c. Globe Luuorutories, 165 .Nebr.138, 8-± NW 2d 
1.)L, eikd in }Jlaintiffa' brief at p. 2-±, the court quoted 
with a}l}Jroval from Beid i:. Ehr, -±3 N.D. 109, 174 NW 71, 
a::; follows: 
··'In the face of these physical facts the testi-
mony of experts becomes of little probative force. 
Tht' jury must have disbelieved the testimony of 
tlw experts, and this they did have a right to do. 
Jurors, as a rule, are men of average and reason-
able minds and in the face of physical facts expert 
tPstimony, did not have any great weight with 
them.'" 
And in State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Anderson-
Webcr, Inc., 252 Iowa 1289, 110 NW 2d 4-±9, cited in 
plaintiffs' brief at p. 2-±, the court said: 
•'\Ye do not mean that the mere happening 
of the event without evidence as to the cause cre-
ates a jury question. The burden of showing cause 
is on the plaintiff, but if he offers evidence from 
which reasonable minds could reach a conclusion, 
the question is for the jury. In the instant case the 
parties offered conflicting theories, supported by 
eircumstantial evidence and opinion testimony. In 
order to establish a proposition by circumstantial 
evidence, the evidence must be such as to make the 
claimant's theory reasonably probable, not merely 
possible, and more probable than any other theory 
based on the evidence, but the evidence need not 
exclude every other possible theory .... 
"It is not for the court to say which theory 
is more probable." 
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POINT III. 
THE COURT DID N011 ERR IN REFUSING 
PLAINTIFFS' REQUESrrBD INSTRUCTION 
ON THE BORRO\VED SERVANT DOC-
TRINE. 
\Ve believ1c' that plaintiffs' Point III is fully answer-
ed under Point III of the brief of defrndant and respon-
dent, Shurtleff & Andrews. \Ve join in that. However, 
we may add that plaintiffs apparently misconceive the 
nature of the loaned servant doctrine. The principle is 
that where a person is in the general employ of one 
employer, and is temporarily loaned to another, during 
the period of such loan he becomes the employee of the 
other who is in turn liable for his negligent acts. Accord-
ing to plaintiffs' contentions, Holmes and Pilling were 
in the general employ of Shurtleff & Andrews and were 
loaned to Arch Dam. We do not believe that the evi-
dence supports this claim. The evidence shows without 
dispute that they were hired directly by Arch Dam; were 
on Arch Dam's payroll, and had not been on the payroll 
of Shurtleff & Andrews for many months prior to the 
accident. Although they operated equipment owned by 
Shurtleff & Andrews and leased to Arch Dam, they also 
operated other equipment owned by Arch Dam, or ob-
tained bv it from other sources. They worked under the 
direct supervision and control of Arch Dam's foremen 
and superintendents. They were in no sense of the word 
Shurtleff & Andrews' employees. 
However, even if it be conceded that they were gen-
eral employees of Shurtleff & Andrews, under the bor-
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n1\n•d servant doctrirn~ for \vhich plaintiffs contend, they 
\roul<l. lw t•mployees of Arch Dam for purposes of this 
snit, since they were on its payroll and acting under 
the di red supervision and control of Arch Dam, and 
\\'en:• \Yholly free from the control of Shurtleff & An-
drews. Even under the loaned servant doctrine, Shurtleff 
& ~"1.mll'!-'\\'S would not be liable for their negligence, if 
an:r, during the time that they were under the control 
and direction of Arch Dam. 
A case very similar on its facts is VanDeusen v. 
Ruht.z-Pikc E11gi11ccring & Constr. Corp., 238 App. Div. 
GS, :2fi-l: ~.Y.8. 395. There, as here, plaintiff's intestate 
was an employee of a general contractor who had leased 
a shovel from the defendant. In that case the defendant 
also furnished an operator and charged a flat rate in-
cluding both the shovel and the operator. An accident 
resulted from the negligence of the shovel operator. The 
court held that at the time of the accident he was an 
employee of decedent's own employer, the general con-
tractor, and therefore defendant was not liable. Said 
the Court: 
"This is not a case where this defendant ... , 
entered into a contract to do work for the general 
contractor as an independent contractor, but in-
stead the general contractor hired the shovel and 
the servant to do the work for it and the operator 
became for the time being the servant of the gen-
eral contractor which was liable for his negli-
gence." 
The facts of the present case are even stronger, for 
here the crane was furnished on a bare rental agreement 
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rather than with operator. Arch Dam made its own 
arrangements directly ·with Pilling and Holmes for their 
employment. 
We also quote from the syllabus of the court in the 
case of Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Henry J. Spieker Co., 
et al., 103 0. A pp. 155, 146 NE 2d 138: 
3. "The rule is established in this state that 
where equipment is supplied to another under a 
rental agreement and the supplier as bailor also 
loans his employees to operate the equipment in 
the performance of work under the exclusive con-
trol and direction of the persons to ·whom the 
equipment is supplied, the owner and supplier 
of the equipment is not responsible for the acts 
of his employees in the performance of the work, 
and the person to whom the equipment has been 
rented is liable ... for damages ... as a proximate 
result of the negligence of the employees in charge 
of the equipment while acting under the directions 
of the bailee." 
CONCLUSION 
The jury has found that the accident was not caused 
by any negligence on the part of defendant. The finding 
is supported by substantial evidence and under familiar 
principles should not be overturned. There was no error 
in withdrawing the issue of warranty from the jury or in 
refusing plaintiffs' requested instruction on the borrowed 
servant doctrine. The judgment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CHRISTENSEN AND JENSEN 
By RAY R. CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for third party defend-
ants and respondents 
